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During trial it was established that the plaintiff had falsified
his affidavit. He had not been ill, but rather had been actively
seeking to procure a barber's license. Defendant's renewal motion
to dismiss was denied by the trial court, but, the appellate division
reversed and granted the motion nunc pro tunc on the ground that
the plaintiff's lie had deprived the defendant of the relief he should
have originally received.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's conclusion noting that, since an honest man would originally have been
thrown out
of court, a failure to dismiss would put a premium on
53
perjury.
CPLR 3025(c).: Infant plaintiff permitted to amend ad damnum
after verdict.
CPLR 3025(c) allows a court to permit amendment of pleadings, before or after judgment, on such terms as may be just, so
as to conform them to the evidence. CPLR 3017 allows a court
to grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the
proof whether or not demanded. It would seem that these sections
54
would permit recovery beyond a complaint's ad damnum clause.
However, it has long been established in New York that a plaintiff's recovery is limited to the amount of damages sought in his
complaint. 55
An exception to this rule has been created by Naujokas v.
H. Frank Carey High School. 6 Infant plaintiff sustained severe
injuries in an accident on a school trampoline and demanded $50,000
in damages. After a jury returned a verdict for five times that
amount, the court permitted the plaintiff to increase the amount of
damages sought in the ad damnum clause. The court based its decision on the fact that defendant would not be prejudiced and that
the rights of an infant were involved. Emphasizing that an infant
is considered a ward of the court, whose rights cannot be lost
through the negligence, mistake or inadvertence of his guardian ad
litem or attorney, the court cited previous instances of judicial

53See 7B

McKINNEY's CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 72 (1968).
54In Riggs, Ferris & Greer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1963),

the court so construed the then soon to be enacted CPLR. But see 3
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See, e.g., Michalowski v. Ey, 7 N.Y.2d 71, 163 N.E.2d 863, 195
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1959); Garden Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bernstein, 24 App.
Div. 2d 512, 261 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dep't 1965); Silbert v. Silbert, 22 App.
Div. 2d 893, 255 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1964).
so 57 Misc. 2d 175, 292 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
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leniency in an infant's behalf.5 ' Thus, an infant has been released
from the burden of another's failure to file a timely notice of
claim, s and courts have directed the settlement of an infant's claim
where the guardian ad litem was unreasonable in resisting a settlement offer.,5
In the absence of prejudice to the defendant there seems to be
no reason why an amendment cannot be allowed after the verdict;
however, it must be emphasized that the holding of the instant case
will probably not be extended beyond infant plaintiffs.
ARTicLE 31 -

DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(e).: Insurer will not be permitted to use medical payments obligation as a means of clandestine discovery.
CPLR 3101 (e) provides that a party may obtain a copy of his
own statement.6
In Juskowitz v. Hahn,61 plaintiffs' attorney moved
to suppress statements taken from plaintiffs by defendant's insurer
and to require defendant to furnish copies of the statements. Defendant's insurer had obtained the information, after commencement of the action, in connection with medical payments made to
plaintiffs under defendant's policy. The statements were procured
without the knowledge of plaintiffs' counsel.
Defendant's counsel, originally unaware of the insurer's acts,
opposed the motion arguing that the insurer had taken the statements in its own behalf and not on behalf of defendant.62 The

57 See, e.g., Glogowski v. Rapson, 20 Misc. 2d 96, 193 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup.
Ct Monroe County 1959); Wannemacher v. Tynan, 144 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1955). An attorney has no greater authority to compromise, settle or discharge an infant's cause of action than a guardian ad
litem. CPLR 1207, 1203; Greenburg v. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R.,
210 N.Y. 505, 104 N.E. 931 (1914).
5
8 Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 137 N.Y.S.2d 773
(2d Dep't 1955).
5
9Glogowski v. Rapson, 20 Misc. 2d 96, 198 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1959).
60 Commentators have indicated that it is not necessary to show special
circumstances.
See 3 WEin'sT
, KORN & MILLER, NEw YORK CIVML
PRACTIcE 113101.56 (1965), and 7B McKIxNEY's CPLR. 3101, commentary
6 (1963).
For further discussion of CPLR 3101(e) see The Bianncal
Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 406, 437-39 (1964),
and The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOrN'S L. REv.
279, 303 (1966).
61 56 Misc. 2d 647, 289 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
62 Defendant's second argument that the motion was untimely since the
case was on the Ready Day Calendar was rejected since the insurer took
the statement without the knowledge of plaintiff's counsel.

